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Zero-sum stochastic differential game in finite horizon
involving impulse controls
Brahim EL ASRI ∗ and Sehail MAZID †
Abstract
This paper considers the problem of two-player zero-sum stochastic differential
game with both players adopting impulse controls in finite horizon under rather weak
assumptions on the cost functions (c and χ not decreasing in time). We use the
dynamic programming principle and viscosity solutions approach to show existence
and uniqueness of a solution for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) partial
differential equation (PDE) of the game. We prove that the upper and lower value
functions coincide.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider the state process of the stochastic differential game, defined
as the solution of the following stochastic equation:
Xs = x+
∫ s
t
b(r,Xr)dr +
∫ s
t
σ(r,Xr)dWr +
∑
m≥1
ξm1 [τm,T ](s)
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
l≥1
ηl1 [ρl,T ](s), s ≥ t,
for all s ∈ [t, T ], P-a.s., with Xt− = x. Here W is a d-dimensional Wiener process, while
u(s) =
∑
m≥1
ξm1 [τm,T ](s) and v(s) =
∑
l≥1
ηl1 [ρl,T ](s)
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are the impulse controls of player I and player II, respectively. The random variables ξm
and ηl take values in two convex cones U and V of R
n, respectively, called the spaces
of control actions. The infinite product
∏
l≥1 1 {τm 6=ρl} has the following meaning: When
the two players act together on the system at the same time, we take into account only
the action of player II. We denote by X t,x,u,v = {X t,x,u,vs , t ≤ s ≤ T} the state trajectory
of the game with initial time t, initial state x, and impulse controls u and v. The gain
functional for player I (resp., cost functional for player II) is given by
J(t, x; u, v) = E
[ ∫ T
t
f(s,X t,x,u,vs )ds−
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤T ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
l≥1
χ(ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤T ] + g(X
t,x,u,v
T )
]
,
(1.1)
f is the running gain and g is the payoff. The function c is the cost function for player I
and is a gain function for player II, meaning that when player I performs an action he/she
has to pay a cost, resulting in a gain for player II. Analogously, χ is the cost function for
player II and is a gain function for player I. The zero-sum stochastic differential games
problems we will investigate is to show the upper and lower value functions coincide and
the game admits a value.
The stochastic differential games problem have recently attracted a lot of research ac-
tivities, especially in connection with mathematical finance, commodities, and in particu-
lar energy markets, etc (see e.g. [1, 3, 4, 9, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25] and the references
therein). In order to tackle those problems, authors use mainly two approaches. Either
a probabilistic one [8, 13] or an approach which uses the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs
(HJBI) partial differential equation (PDE)[17].
In the finite horizon framework, Cosso [6] have studied a two-player zero-sum stochastic
differential game with both players adopting impulse controls using viscosity solutions to
the HJBI equation. They have proved existence and uniqueness for the HJBI equation
under stronger constraint (see also Tang and Yong [28]): the cost functions c and χ are
decreasing in time:
c(t, y) ≥ c(t′, y) and χ(t, z) ≥ χ(t′, z),
for every 0 ≤ t ≤ t′ ≤ T , y ∈ U and z ∈ V.
Our aim in this work lies in the fact that we investigate the solution to the zero-sum
stochastic differential games under rather weak assumptions on the cost functions(c and
2
χ are not decreasing in time). Therefore the main objective of our work, and this is
the novelty of the paper is to characterize the value function as the only solution in vis-
cosity sense of the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) partial differential
equation (PDE) for the finite horizon problem.
We prove the lower and the upper value functions of stochastic differential game satisfy
the dynamic programming principle. We show that the HJBI equation associated to the
stochastic differential game, which turns out to be the same for the two value functions
because the two players cannot act simultaneously on the system, is the unique solution
of the following system:

max
{
min
[
−
∂V
∂t
− LV − f, V −HcsupV
]
, V −HχinfV
}
= 0 [0, T )× Rn
V (T, x) = g(x) ∀x ∈ Rn.
Where L is the second-order local operator, and the nonlocal operators Hcsup and H
χ
inf are
given by
HcsupV (t, x) = sup
ξ∈U
[V (t, x+ ξ)− c(t, ξ)], HχinfV (t, x) = inf
η∈V
[V (t, x+ η) + χ(t, η)],
for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we formulate the problem and we give
the related definitions. In Section 3, we shall introduce the stochastic differential game
problem and give some preliminary results of the lower and the upper value functions of
stochastic differential game. Further we provide some estimate for the optimal strategy
of problem which in combination with the dynamic programming principle plays a crucial
role in the proof of existence the value functions. In Section 4, we prove the dynamic
programming principle. Further, we show the existence and continuity of the lower and
the upper value functions. Section 5, is devoted to the connection between the zero
sum stochastic differential game problem and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation.
In Section 6, we show that the solution of HJBI is unique in the subclass of bounded
continuous functions. Further, the upper and the lower value functions coincide and the
game admits a value.
3
2 Assumptions and formulation of the problem
Throughout this paper T (resp. n, d) is a fixed real (resp. integers) positive numbers.
Let us assume the following assumptions:
(H1) b : [0, T ] × Rn → Rn and σ : [0, T ] × Rn → Rn×d be two continuous functions for
which there exists a constant C > 0 such that for any t ∈ [0, T ] and x, x′ ∈ Rn
|σ(t, x)− σ(t, x′)|+ |b(t, x)− b(t, x′)| ≤ C|x− x′|. (2.1)
Also there exists a constant C > 0 such that for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn
|σ(t, x)|+ |b(t, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|). (2.2)
(H2) f : [0, T ]×Rn → R is uniformly continuous and bounded on [0, T ]×Rn. g : Rn → R
is uniformly continuous and bounded on Rn.
(H3) The cost functions c : [0, T ]× U → R and χ : [0, T ]× V → R are measurable and
uniformly continuous. Furthermore
inf
[0,T ]×U
c ≥ k, inf
[0,T ]×V
χ ≥ k, (2.3)
where k > 0.
Moreover,
c(t, ξ1 + ξ2) ≤ c(t, ξ1) + c(t, ξ2) (2.4)
χ(t, η1 + η2) ≤ χ(t, η1) + χ(t, η2) (2.5)
for every t ∈ [0, T ], ξ1, ξ2 ∈ U and η1, η2 ∈ V.
(H4) (no terminal impulse). For any x ∈ Rn, η ∈ V and ξ ∈ U
sup
ξ∈U
[g(x+ ξ)− c(T, ξ)] ≤ g(x) ≤ inf
η∈V
[g(x+ η) + χ(T, η)]. (2.6)
U and V are two convex cones of Rn with U ⊂ V.
Remark 1 The above assumptions (2.4) and (2.5) ensures that multiple impulses occur-
ring at the same time are suboptimal. ✷
We now consider the HJBI equation:

max
{
min
[
−
∂V
∂t
−LV − f, V −HcsupV
]
, V −HχinfV
}
= 0 [0, T )× Rn,
V (T, x) = g(x) ∀x ∈ Rn.
(2.7)
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Where L is the second-order local operator
LV = 〈b,∇xV 〉+
1
2
tr[σσ∗∇2xV ],
and the nonlocal operators Hcsup and H
χ
inf are given by
HcsupV (t, x) = sup
ξ∈U
[V (t, x+ ξ)− c(t, ξ)], HχinfV (t, x) = inf
η∈V
[V (t, x+ η) + χ(t, η)],
for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
The main objective of this paper is to focus on the existence and uniqueness of the
solution in viscosity sense of (2.7) whose definition is:
Definition 1 Let V be a continuous function defined on [0, T ]×Rn and such that V (T, x) =
g(x) for any x ∈ Rn. The V is called:
(i) A viscosity subsolution of (2.7) if for any (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ) × R
n and any function
φ ∈ C1,2([0, T )× Rn), such that (t0, x0) is a local maximum of V − φ, we have:
max
{
min
[
−
∂φ
∂t
(t0, x0)−Lφ(t0, x0)− f(t0, x0), V (t0, x0)−H
c
supV (t0, x0)
]
,
V (t0, x0)−H
χ
infV (t0, x0)
}
≤ 0.
(2.8)
(ii) A viscosity supersolution of (2.7) if for any (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T )×R
n and any function
φ ∈ C1,2([0, T )× Rn), such that is (t0, x0) a local minimum of V − φ, we have:
max
{
min
[
−
∂φ
∂t
(t0, x0)−Lφ(t0, x0)− f(t0, x0), V (t0, x0)−H
c
supV (t0, x0)
]
,
V (t0, x0)−H
χ
infV (t0, x0)
}
≥ 0.
(2.9)
(iii) A viscosity solution if it is both a viscosity supersolution and subsolution. ✷
There is an equivalent formulation of this definition (see e.g. [7]) which we give because
it will be useful later. So firstly, we define the notions of superjet and subjet of a continuous
function V .
Definition 2 Let V ∈ C((0, T ) × Rn), (t, x) an element of (0, T ) × Rn and finally Sn
the set of n × n symmetric matrices. We denote by J2,+V (t, x) (resp. J2,−V (t, x)), the
superjets (resp. the subjets) of V at (t, x), the set of triples (p, q,X) ∈ R×Rn × Sn such
that:
V (s, y) ≤ V (t, x) + p(s− t) + 〈q, y − x〉 +
1
2
〈X(y − x), y − x〉+ o(|s− t|+ |y − x|2)(
resp.
V (s, y) ≥ V (t, x) + p(s− t) + 〈q, y − x〉+
1
2
〈X(y − x), y − x〉+ o(|s− t|+ |y − x|2)
)
.✷
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Note that if φ − V has a local maximum (resp. minimum) at (t, x), then we obviously
have:
(Dtφ(t, x), Dxφ(t, x), D
2
xxφ(t, x)) ∈ J
2,−V (t, x) (resp. J2,+V (t, x)).✷
We now give an equivalent definition of a viscosity solution of HJBI equation(2.7):
Definition 3 Let V be a continuous function defined on [0, T ]×Rn and such that V (T, x) =
g(x) for any x ∈ Rn. Then V is a viscosity supersolution (resp., subsolution) to the HJBI
equation (2.7) if and only if for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rn and (p, q,X) ∈ J2,−V (t, x) (resp.
J2,+V (t, x)),
max
{
min
[
− p− 〈b, q〉 −
1
2
Tr
[
σ∗Xσ
]
− f(t, x), V (t, x)−HcsupV (t, x)
]
,
V (t, x)−HχinfV (t, x)
}
≥ 0 (resp., ≤ 0).
It is called a viscosity solution it is both a viscosity subsolution and supersolution. ✷
As pointed out previously we will show that system (2.7) has a unique solution in
viscosity sense. This system is the deterministic version of the stochastic differential
game problem will describe briefly in the next section.
3 The stochastic differential game problem
3.1 Setting of the problem
Let (Ω,F ,P) is a fixed probability space on which is defined a standard d-dimensional
Brownian motion W = (Wt)t≤T , whose natural filtration is (F
0
t := σ{Ws; s ≤ t})0≤t≤T .
We denote by F = (Ft)t≤T the completed filtration of (F
0
t )t≤T with the P-null sets of F .
We are given two convex cones U and V of Rn, with V ⊂ U . We call U and V the spaces
of controle actions. We begin by introducing the concept of impulse control.
Definition 4 An impulse control u =
∑
m≥1
ξm1 [τm,T ] for player I (resp, v =
∑
l≥1
ηl1 [ρl,T ] for
player II) on [t, T ] ⊂ R+ = [0,+∞), is such that:
(i) (τm)m (resp., (ρl)l), the action times, is a sequence of F-stopping times, valued in
[t, T ] ∪ {+∞} such that P-a.s. τm ≤ τm+1 (resp., ρl ≤ ρl+1).
(ii) (ξm)m (resp., (ηl)l), the actions, is a sequence of U-valued (resp, V-valued) random
variables, where each ξm (resp., ηl) is Fτm-measurable (resp., Fρl-measurable).
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Let t ∈ [0, T ] be the initial time of the game and x ∈ Rn the initial state. Then, given
the impulse controls u and v on [t, T ], the state process of the stochastic differential game
is defined as the solution to the following stochastic equation:
Xs = x+
∫ s
t
b(r,Xr)dr +
∫ s
t
σ(r,Xr)dWr +
∑
m≥1
ξm1 [τm,T ](s)
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
l≥1
ηl1 [ρl,T ](s), s ≥ t,
(3.1)
Then, under (H1), the stochastic differential equation (3.1) admits a unique solution
X t,x,u,v = {X t,x,u,vs , t ≤ s ≤ T} for every (t, x) ∈[0,T]×R
n, u ∈ U and v ∈ V. The gain
functional for player I (resp., cost functional for player II) is given by
J(t, x, u, v) := E
[ ∫ T
t
f(s,X t,x,u,vs )ds−
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤T ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
l≥1
χ(ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤T ] + g(X
t,x,u,v
T )
]
,
(3.2)
f is the running gain and g is the payoff. The function c is the cost function for player I
and is a gain function for player II, meaning that when player I performs an action he/she
has to pay a cost, resulting in a gain for player II. Analogously, χ is the cost function for
player II and is a gain function for player I.
Definition 5 Let u =
∑
m≥1
ξm1 [τm,T ] be an impulse control on [t, T ], and let τ ≤ σ be two
[t, T ]-valued F-stopping times. Then we define the restriction u[τ,σ] of the impulse control
u by:
u[τ,σ](s) =
∑
m≥1
ξµt,τ (u)+m1 [τµt,τ (u)+m≤s≤σ](s), τ ≤ s ≤ σ, (3.3)
µt,τ is the number of impulses up to time τ , i.e.,
µt,τ(u) :=
∑
m≥1
1 [τm≤τ ]. (3.4)
Definition 6 (Admissible impulse control). An admissible impulse control u for player
I (resp., v for player II) on [t, T ] ⊂ R+, is an impulse control for player I (resp., II) on
[t, T ] with a finite average number of impulses, i.e.,
E[µt,T (u)] <∞ (resp., E[µt,T (v)] <∞).
The set of all admissible impulse controls for player I (resp., II) on [t, T ] is denoted by
Ut,T (resp., Vt,T ).
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Next, we adopt the notion of Control identification and nonanticipative strategy.
Definition 7 (Control identification).
Let u =
∑
m≥1
ξm1 [τm,T ] and u
′ =
∑
m≥1
ξ′m1 [τ ′m,T ] in Ut,T , we write u ≡ u
′ on [t, T ] if
P({u = u′ a.e. on [t, T ]}) = 1.
Similarly, we interpret v ≡ v′ on [t, T ] in Vt,T .
Definition 8 (nonanticipative strategy). The nonanticipative strategy set At,T for player
I is the collection of all nonanticipative maps α from Vt,T to Ut,T , i.e for any [t, T ]-valued
F-stopping times τ and any v1,v2 ∈ Vt,T ,
if v1 ≡ v2 on [t, τ ], then
α(v1) ≡ α(v2) on [t, τ ].
Analogously, the nonanticipative strategy set Bt,T for player II is the collection of all
nonanticipative maps β from Ut,T to Vt,T .
We are now ready to introduce the upper and lower values of the game:
For every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn let us set
V −(t, x) := inf
β∈Bt,T
sup
u∈Ut,T
J(t, x, u, β(u)) (3.5)
and
V +(t, x) := sup
α∈At,T
inf
v∈Vt,T
J(t, x, α(v), v) (3.6)
The maps V − and V + are called the lower value and the upper value of the game, respec-
tively. The game is said to admit a value if V − = V +.
The HJBI equation associated to the stochastic differential game, which turns out to
be the same for the two value functions because the two players cannot act simultaneously
on the system, is given by (2.7).
Remark 2 The infinite product
∏
l≥1 1 {τm 6=ρl} in (3.1) means that when the two players
act together on the system, we take into account only the action of player II. When take
into account only the action of player I instead of player II. Then, using arguments anal-
ogous to those presented in the sections below, it can be proved that, with this assumption,
the corresponding HJBI equation is given by

min
{
max
[
−
∂V
∂t
− LV − f, V −HχinfV
]
, V −HcsupV
}
= 0 [0, T )× Rn
V (T, x) = g(x) ∀x ∈ Rn.
(3.7)
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3.2 Preliminary results
In this section we present some properties of the lower and upper value functions of
our differential game.
We begin by the following lemma, which is concerned with the continuous dependence
of X t,x,u,v with respect to x.
Lemma 1 Under assumption (H1) there exists a constant C > 0 such that, for every
t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rn, u ∈ Ut,T and v ∈ Vt,T we have:
E
[
|X t,x,u,vs −X
t,x′,u,v
s |
]
≤ C|x− x′|. (3.8)
Proof . see [[26], Appendix]
Next, in the following proposition, we prove that the two value functions are bounded.
Theorem 1 Under the standing assumptions (H1), (H2) and (H3), the lower and upper
value functions are bounded.
Proof : We make the proof only for the lower value function V −, the other case being
analogous.
Using the definition of lower value function, we have, for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn
V −(t, x) = inf
β∈Bt,T
sup
u∈Ut,T
E
[ ∫ T
t
f(s,X t,x,u,β(u)s )ds−
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤T ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
l≥1
χ(ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤T ] + g(X
t,x,u,β(u)
T )
]
≤ sup
u∈Ut,T
E
[ ∫ T
t
f(s,X t,x,u,v0s )ds−
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤T ] + g(X
t,x,u,v0
T )
]
,
where v0 is the control with no impulses.
Let ǫ > 0, then there exists a strategy uǫ ∈ Ut,T such that
V −(t, x) ≤ E
[ ∫ T
t
f(s,X t,x,u
ǫ,v0
s )ds−
∑
m≥1
c(τ ǫm, ξ
ǫ
m)1 [τǫm≤T ] + g(X
t,x,uǫ,v0
T )
]
+ ǫ.
Since the cost c(τ ǫm, ξ
ǫ
m) are non negative functions, then we have
V −(t, x) ≤ E
[ ∫ T
t
f(s,X t,x,u
ǫ,v0
s )ds+ g(X
t,x,uǫ,v0
T )
]
+ ǫ.
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Therefore we find, using also the boundedness of f and g, that there exists a constant
C > 0 such that
V −(t, x) ≤ C.
In a similar way we can prove that there exists a constant C > 0 such that
V −(t, x) ≥ −C,
from which we deduce the thesis. ✷
We are now giving some properties of nearly nearly optimal strategies.
Proposition 1 Let u ∈ Ut,T and v ∈ Vt,T be a nearly optimal strategies composed of
impulses control (τ, ξ) = ((τn)n≥1, (ξn)n≥1) and (ρ, η) = ((ρn)n≥1, (ηn)n≥1). Then:∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤T ] +
∑
l≥1
χ(ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤T ] ≤ C. (3.9)
There exists a positive constant C > 0 which does not depend on t and x such that:
∀n ≥ 1, P[τn ≤ T ] + P[ρn ≤ T ] ≤
C
n
. (3.10)
We denote by Ût,T and V̂t,T the set which satisfies the conditions (3.9) and (3.10), respec-
tively. Similarly, by Ât,T and B̂t,T the sets that contain all the nonanticipative strategies
with values in Ût,T and V̂t,T , respectively.
Proof . Let us choose a nearly optimal strategy u ∈ Ut,T composed of impulse control
((τn)n≥1, (ξn)n≥1) such that, for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R
n,
E
[ ∫ T
t
f(s,X t,x,u,v0s )ds −
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤T ] + g(X
t,x,u,v0
T )
]
≥ V −(t, x) − 1.
Since V −, f and g are bounded, then we have
E
[∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤T ]
]
≤ C.
Next we show (3.10). Taking into account that c(τ, ξ) ≥ k > 0 for any (τ, ξ) ∈ [0, T ]×Ut,T ,
we obtain:
E
[∑
m≥1
k1 [τm≤T ]
]
≤ C.
But for any m ≤ n, [τn ≤ T ] ⊆ [τm ≤ T ], then:
E
[
nk1 [τn≤T ]
]
≤ C.
Finally taking into account k > 0, we obtain the desired result.
The other case being analogous. ✷
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Corollary 1 Under the standing assumptions (H1), (H2) and (H3), J(t, x, u, v) is
bounded for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, u ∈ Ût,T and v ∈ V̂t,T .
In the following proposition, using Lemma 1, we prove that the lower and upper value
functions are continuous in the state variable, together with the gain functional.
Proposition 2 The gain functional, lower and upper value functions are continuous in
x.
Proof. It is enough to show that the conclusion holds for the gain functional J .
For every t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rn, u ∈ Ut,T , v ∈ Vt,T , we have
|J(t, x, u, v)− J(t, x′, u, v)| ≤ E
[ ∫ T
t
|f(s,X t,x,u,vs )− f(s,X
t,x′,u,v
s )|ds
+ |g(X t,x,u,vT )− g(X
t,x′,u,v
T )|
]
.
From Lemma 1 and continuity of f and g in x we get the thesis. ✷
4 The value functions
4.1 Dynamic Programming Principle
In this section we present the dynamic programming principle (DPP) for the stochastic
differential game. We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 2 ([6], Lemma 3.3). The lower and upper value functions are given by
V −(t, x) := inf
β∈B¯t,T
sup
u∈U¯t,T
J(t, x, u, β(u)) (4.1)
and
V +(t, x) := sup
α∈A¯t,T
inf
v∈V¯t,T
J(t, x, α(v), v) (4.2)
for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn, where U¯t,T and V¯t,T contain all the impulse controls in Ût,T
and V̂t,T , respectively, which have no impulses at time t. Similarly, A¯t,T and B¯t,T are
subsets of Ât,T and B̂t,T , respectively. In particular, they contain all the nonanticipative
strategies with values in U¯t,T and V¯t,T , respectively.
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Theorem 2 Under assumptions (H1), (H2) and (H3), given 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T , x ∈ Rn,
and each family of Q[t,T ]−valued Ft,s-stopping times {τ
u,v, (u, v) ∈ Ût,T × V̂t,T}, we have
V −(t, x) ≤ inf
β∈B̂t,T
sup
u∈Ût,T
E
[ ∫ τu,β
t
f(r,X t,x,u,β(u)r )dr −
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤τu,β ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
l≥1
χ(ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤τu,β ] + (V
−)∗(τu,β, X
t,x,u,β(u)
τu,β
)
]
,
(4.3)
V −(t, x) ≥ inf
β∈B̂t,T
sup
u∈Ût,T
E
[ ∫ τu,β
t
f(r,X t,x,u,β(u)r )dr −
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤τu,β ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
l≥1
χ(ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤τu,β ] + (V
−)∗(τ
u,β, X
t,x,u,β(u)
τu,β
)
]
,
(4.4)
V +(t, x) ≤ sup
α∈Ât,T
inf
v∈V̂t,T
E
[ ∫ τα,v
t
f(r,X t,x,α(v),vr )dr −
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤τα,v]
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
l≥1
χ(ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤τα,v] + (V
+)∗(τα,v, X
t,x,α(v),v
τα,v )
]
,
(4.5)
and
V +(t, x) ≥ sup
α∈Ât,T
inf
v∈V̂t,T
E
[ ∫ τα,v
t
f(r,X t,x,α(v),vr )dr −
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤τα,v]
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
l≥1
χ(ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤τα,v] + (V
+)∗(τ
α,v, X
t,x,α(v),v
τα,v )
]
,
(4.6)
where Q[t,T ] = (Q∩ [t, T ])∪ {t, T}, and V∗ (resp., V
∗) its lower (resp. upper) semicontin-
uous envelope defined by:
V∗(t, x) := lim inf
(s,y)→(t,x)
(s,y)∈[0,T ]×Rn
V (s, y) and V ∗(t, x) := lim sup
(s,y)→(t,x)
(s,y)∈[0,T ]×Rn
V (s, y).
P roof . We prove the dynamic programming principle only for V −, the other case being
analogous.
Let ǫ > 0 and consider an arbitrary function
φ : [0, T ]× Rn −→ R such that φ continuous, bounded from above and V − ≤ φ.
For each (s, y) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, there exists βǫ ∈ B¯s,T such that
φ(s, y) ≥ V −(s, y) ≥ J(s, y, u[s,T ], β
ǫ(u[s,T ]))− ǫ, (4.7)
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where u[s,T ] is as introduced in Definition 5. Let Q[t,T ] := {ti}i≥1 and fix one of the points
ti in time. For each y ∈ R
n, the continuity of J established in Proposition 2 and that of
φ imply that there exists a neighborhood Bi(y) ⊆ Rn (of size depending on y, i, ǫ) such
that {
φ(ti, y
′) ≥ φ(ti, y)− ǫ,
J(ti, y
′, u[ti,T ], v) ≤ J(ti, y, u[ti,T ], v) + ǫ,
(4.8)
for all y′ ∈ Bi(y) and v ∈ V¯ti,T .
Therefore, since the family {Bi(y) : y ∈ Rn} forms an open cover of Rn, there exists
a sequence (yj)j≥1 in R
n such that {Bi(yj)}j≥1 is a countable subcover of R
n. We set
βi,j := β
ti,yj ∈ B¯ti,T and B
i
j := B
i(yj).
We can now define, for i still being fixed, a measurable partition (Aij)j≥1 by
Ai1 := B
i
1, A
i
j+1 := B
i
j+1 \ (B
i
1 ∪ ... ∪ B
i
j), j ≥ 1.
Since Aij ⊆ B
i
j , the inequalities (4.7) and (4.8) yield that
φ(ti, y
′) ≥ J(ti, y
′, u[ti,T ], βi,j(u[ti,T ]))− 3ǫ for all y
′ ∈ Aij. (4.9)
Now, let (u, β) ∈ Ût,T ×B̂t,T be arbitrary and set τ = τ
β(u),u. Fix an integer k ≥ 1, we now
focus on (ti)1≤i≤k. We may assume that t1 < t2 < ... < tk, by eliminating and relabeling
some of the ti. We define the F
t
τ -measurable sets
Γij := {τ = ti and X
t,x,u,β(u)
ti
∈ Aij} ∈ Fti and Γ(k) :=
⋃
1≤i,j≤k
Γij.
Since the ti are distinct and A
i
j∩A
i
j′ = ∅ for j 6= j
′, we have Γij∩Γ
i′
j′ = ∅ for (i, j) 6= (i
′, j′).
We construct the strategy βk by
βk(u) = β(u)1 [t,τ ] + 1 (τ,T ]
(
β(u)1 (Γ(k))c +
∑
1≤i,j≤k
βi,j(u[tj ,T ])1 Γij
)
,
Then
J(t, x, u, βk(u)) = E
[ ∫ τ
t
f(r,X t,x,u,β(u)r )dr −
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤τ ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
l≥1
χ(ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤τ ] + J(t, x, u, β(u))1 (Γ(k))c +
∑
1≤i,j≤k
J(τ,X
t,x,u,β(u)
τ , u[ti,T ], βi,j(u[ti,T ]))1 Γij
]
.
(4.10)
We deduce via (4.9) that
E
[ ∑
1≤i,j≤k
J(τ,X t,x,u,β(u)τ , u[ti,T ], βi,j(u[ti,T ]))1 Γij
]
≤ E
[
φ(τ,X t,x,u,β(u)τ )1 Γ(k)
]
+ 3ǫ, (4.11)
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for every k ≥ 1. Letting k →∞, therefore,
E
[
J(t, x, u, β(u))1 (Γ(k))c
]
−→ 0
by dominated convergence and Corollary 1. Moreover, monotone convergence yields
E
[
φ(τ,X t,x,u,β(u)τ )1 Γ(k)
]
−→ E
[
φ(τ,X t,x,u,β(u)τ )
]
.
Therefore, we deduce the existence of an integer k0 ≥ 1 such that
J(t, x, u, βk0(u)) ≤ E
[ ∫ τ
t
f(r,X t,x,u,β(u)r )dr −
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤τ ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
l≥1
χ(ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤τ ] + φ(τ,X
t,x,u,β(u)
τ )
]
+ 4ǫ.
(4.12)
Let a sequence of continuous functions (φn)n such that φn ≥ (V
−)∗ for all n ≥ 1 and such
that φn converges pointwise to (V
−)∗. Set ϕN := maxn≥Nφn for N ≥ 1 and observe that
the sequence (ϕN)N is decreasing and converges pointwise to (V
−)∗. By the monotone
convergence theorem, we then obtain:
E
[
ϕN(τ,X
t,x,u,β(u)
τ )
]
−→
N→+∞
E
[
(V −)∗(τ,X t,x,u,β(u)τ )
]
.
Therefore, we have
V −(t, x) ≤ sup
u∈Ût,T
E
[ ∫ τ
t
f(r,X t,x,u,β(u)r )dr −
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤τ ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
l≥1
χ(ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤τ ] + (V
−)∗(τ,X
t,x,u,β(u)
τ )
]
+ 4ǫ.
(4.13)
As β and ǫ are arbitrary then sending ǫ → 0, and take infimums in right-hand side of
(4.13), to obtain:
V −(t, x) ≤ inf
β∈B̂t,T
sup
u∈Ût,T
E
[ ∫ τ
t
f(r,X t,x,u,β(u)r )dr −
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤τ ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
l≥1
χ(ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤τ ] + (V
−)∗(τ,X
t,x,u,β(u)
τ )
]
.
(4.14)
In a similar way we can prove the reverse inequality, hence deducing the thesis. ✷
4.2 Continuity of value functions in time
In this section we prove the continuity of lower value function and upper value function
in t .
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First, we know that any stopping time τ can be approximated by a sequence of rational
stopping times τ (n) = 2−n([2nτ ]− 1). Then we can pose
(H5) The action times ρl and τm takes values in Q[t,T ]
Theorem 3 The lower and upper value functions are continuous in t.
Proof. We make the proof only for V −, the other case being analogous.
First let us show that V − is lower semi-continuous.
Recall the characterization of dynamical programming principle that reads as
V −(t′, x) ≤ inf
β∈B̂t′,T
sup
u∈Ût′,T
E
[ ∫ ρn∧T
t′
f(r,X t
′,x,u,β(u)
r )dr −
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤ρn∧T ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
1≤l≤n
χ(ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤T ] + 1 [ρn≤T ](V
−)∗(ρn, X
t′,x,u,β(u)
ρn ) + 1 [ρn=+∞]g(X
t′,x,u,β(u)
T )
]
.
V −(t, x) ≥ inf
β∈B̂t,T
sup
u∈Ût,T
E
[ ∫ ρn∧T
t
f(r,X t,x,u,β(u)r )dr −
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤ρn∧T ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
1≤l≤n
χ(ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤T ] + 1 [ρn≤T ](V
−)∗(ρn, X
t,x,u,β(u)
ρn ) + 1 [ρn=+∞]g(X
t,x,u,β(u)
T )
]
.
Fix an arbitrary ǫ > 0, and we assume that t < t′. Pick βǫ ∈ B̂t,T such that
V −(t, x) + ǫ ≥ E
[ ∫ ρǫn∧T
0
f(r,X t,x,u,β
ǫ(u)
r )1 [r≥t]dr −
∑
m≥1
c(t ∨ τm, ξm)1 [τm≤ρn∧T ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρǫl}
+
∑
1≤l≤n
χ(t ∨ ρǫl , η
ǫ
l )1 [ρǫl≤T ] + 1 [ρǫn≤T ](V
−)∗(ρ
ǫ
n, X
t,x,u,βǫ(u)
ρǫn
) + 1 [ρǫn=+∞]g(X
t,x,u,βǫ(u)
T )
]
,
where u ∈ Ût,T will be chosen later. On the other hand, pick u
ǫ ∈ Ût′,T such that
V −(t′, x)− ǫ
≤ E
[ ∫ ρǫn∧T
0
f(r,X t
′,x,uǫ,β¯(uǫ)
r )1 [r≥t′]dr −
∑
m≥1
c(t′ ∨ τ ǫm, ξ
ǫ
m)1 [τǫm≤ρǫn∧T ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τǫm 6=ρǫl}
+
∑
1≤l≤n
χ(t′ ∨ ρǫl , η
ǫ
l )1 [ρǫl≤T ] + 1 [ρǫn≤T ](V
−)∗(ρ
ǫ
n, X
t′,x,uǫ,β¯(uǫ)
ρǫn
) + 1 [ρǫn=+∞]g(X
t′,x,uǫ,β¯(uǫ)
T )
]
,
where
β¯(uǫ) =
∑
1≤l≤n
ηǫl 1 [t′∨ρǫl ,T ] ∈ Bt′,T .
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Therefore
V −(t, x)− V −(t′, x) ≥ E
[ ∫ ρǫn∧T
0
f(r,X t,x,u
ǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
r )1 [r≥t]dr +
∑
1≤l≤n
χ(t ∨ ρǫl , η
ǫ
l )1 [ρǫl≤T ]
+1 [ρǫn≤T ](V
−)∗(ρ
ǫ
n, X
t,x,uǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
ρǫn
) + 1 [ρǫn=+∞]g(X
t,x,uǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
T )
]
−E
[ ∫ ρǫn∧T
0
f(r,X t
′,x,uǫ,β¯(uǫ)
r )1 [r≥t′]dr +
∑
1≤l≤n
χ(t′ ∨ ρǫl , η
ǫ
l )1 [ρǫl≤T ]
+1 [ρǫn≤T ](V
−)∗(ρǫn, X
t′,x,uǫ,β¯(uǫ)
ρǫn
) + 1 [ρǫn=+∞]g(X
t′,x,uǫ,β¯(uǫ)
T )
]
− 2ǫ
≥ E
[
−
∫ ρǫn∧T
0
{|f(r,X t,x,u
ǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
r )− f(r,X
t′,x,uǫ,β¯(uǫ)
r )|1 [r≥t′]}dr
−
∫ ρǫn∧T
0
|f(r,X t,x,u
ǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
r )|1 [t≤r<t′]dr +
∑
1≤l≤n
χ(t ∨ ρǫl , η
ǫ
l )1 [ρǫl≤T ]
−
∑
1≤l≤n
χ(t′ ∨ ρǫl , η
ǫ
l )1 [ρǫl≤T ] − 1 [ρǫn≤T ]{|(V
−)∗(ρ
ǫ
n, X
t,x,uǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
ρǫn
)|
+|(V −)∗(ρǫn, X
t′,x,uǫ,β¯(uǫ)
ρǫn
)|} − 1 [ρǫn=+∞]|g(X
t,x,uǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
T )− g(X
t′,x,uǫ,β¯(uǫ)
T )|
]
− 2ǫ
≥ E
[
−
∫ ρǫn∧T
0
{|f(r,X t,x,u
ǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
r )− f(r,X
t′,x,u¯,uǫ,β¯(uǫ)
r )|1 [r≥t′]}dr
−
∫ ρǫn∧T
0
|f(r,X t,x,u
ǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
r )|1 [t≤r<t′]dr − n max
1≤l≤n
{sup
s≤T
|χ(t ∨ s, ηǫl )− χ(t
′ ∨ s, ηǫl )|}
−1 [ρǫn≤T ]{|(V
−)∗(ρ
ǫ
n, X
t,x,uǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
ρǫn
)|+ |(V −)∗(ρǫn, X
t′,x,uǫ,β¯(uǫ)
ρǫn
)|}
−1 [ρǫn=+∞]|g(X
t,x,uǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
T )− g(X
t′,x,uǫ,β¯(uǫ)
T )|
]
− 2ǫ.
We note that, there exists a constant C > 0 such that
−E
[
1 [ρǫn≤T ]{|(V
−)∗(ρ
ǫ
n, X
t,x,uǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
ρǫn
)|+ |(V −)∗(ρǫn, X
t′,x,uǫ,β¯(uǫ)
ρǫn
)}
]
≥ −
C
n
.
Also, taking the limit as t→ t′, and using the uniform continuity of f , g and χ to obtain:
lim inf
t→t′
V −(t, x) ≥ V −(t′, x)−
C
n
− 2ǫ.
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As n and ǫ are arbitrary then sending ǫ→ 0 and n→ +∞, to obtain:
lim inf
t→t′
V −(t, x) ≥ V −(t′, x).
Therefore V − is lower semi-continuous.
Now we show that V − is upper semi-continuous.
Fix an arbitrary ǫ > 0, and we assume that t < t′.
Pick uǫ ∈ Ût,T such that
V −(t, x)− ǫ ≤ E
[ ∫ τǫn∧T
0
f(r,X t,x,u
ǫ,β(uǫ)
r )1 [r≥t]dr −
∑
1≤m≤n
c(t ∨ τ ǫm, ξ
ǫ
m)1 [τǫm≤T ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τǫm 6=ρl}
+
∑
l≥1
χ(t ∨ ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤τǫn∧T ] + 1 [τǫn≤T ](V
−)∗(τ ǫn, X
t,x,uǫ,β(uǫ)
τǫn
) + 1 [τǫn=+∞]g(X
t,x,uǫ,β(uǫ)
T )
]
,
where β ∈ B̂t,T will be chosen later. On the other hand, pick β
ǫ belongs to B¯t′,T such that
V −(t′, x) + ǫ ≥ E
[ ∫ τǫn∧T
0
f(r,X t
′,x,u¯,βǫ(u¯)
r )1 [r≥t′]dr −
∑
1≤m≤n
c(t′ ∨ τ ǫm, ξ
ǫ
m)1 [τǫm≤T ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τǫm 6=ρǫl}
+
∑
l≥1
χ(t′ ∨ ρǫl , η
ǫ
l )1 [ρǫl≤τǫn∧T ] + 1 [τǫn≤T ](V
−)∗(τ
ǫ
n, X
t′,x,u¯,βǫ(u¯)
τǫn
) + 1 [τǫn=+∞]g(X
t′,x,u¯,βǫ(u¯)
T )
]
,
where
u¯ =
∑
1≤m≤n
ξǫm1 [t′∨τǫm,T ] ∈ Ut′,T .
Therefore
V −(t, x)− V −(t′, x)
≤ E
[ ∫ τǫn∧T
0
f(r,X t,x,u
ǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
r )1 [r≥t]dr −
∑
1≤m≤n
c(t ∨ τ ǫm, ξ
ǫ
m)1 [τǫm≤T ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τǫm 6=ρǫl}
+1 [τǫn≤T ](V
−)∗(τ ǫn, X
t,x,uǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
τǫn
) + 1 [τǫn=+∞]g(X
t,x,uǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
T )
]
−E
[ ∫ τǫn
0
f(r,X t
′,x,u¯,βǫ(u¯)
r )1 [r≥t′]dr −
∑
1≤m≤n
c(t′ ∨ τ ǫm, ξ
ǫ
m)1 [τǫm≤T ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τǫm 6=ρǫl}
+1 [τǫn≤T ](V
−)∗(τ
ǫ
n, X
t′,x,u¯,βǫ(u¯)
τǫn
) + 1 [τǫn=+∞]g(X
t′,x,u¯,βǫ(u¯)
T )
]
+ 2ǫ
(4.15)
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≤ E
[ ∫ τǫn∧T
0
{|f(r,X t,x,u
ǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
r )− f(r,X
t′,x,u¯,βǫ(u¯)
r )|1 [r≥t′]}dr
+
∫ τǫn∧T
0
|f(r,X t,x,u
ǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
r )|1 [t≤r<t′]dr −
∑
1≤m≤n
c(t ∨ τ ǫm, ξ
ǫ
m)1 [τǫm≤T ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τǫm 6=ρǫl}
+
∑
1≤m≤n
c(t′ ∨ τ ǫm, ξ
ǫ
m)1 [τǫm≤T ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τǫm 6=ρǫl} + 1 [τǫn=+∞]|g(X
t,x,uǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
T )− g(X
t′,x,u¯,βǫ(u¯)
T )|
+1 [τǫn≤T ]{|(V
−)∗(τ ǫn, X
t,x,uǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
τǫn
)|+ |(V −)∗(τ
ǫ
n, X
t′,x,u¯,βǫ(u¯)
τǫn
)|}
]
+ 2ǫ
≤ E
[ ∫ τǫn∧T
0
{|f(r,X t,x,u
ǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
r )− f(r,X
t′,x,u¯,βǫ(u¯)
r )|1 [r≥t′]}dr
+
∫ τǫn∧T
0
|f(r,X t,x,u
ǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
r )|1 [t≤r<t′]dr + n max
1≤m≤n
{sup
s≤T
|c(t′ ∨ s, ξǫm)− c(t ∨ s, ξ
ǫ
m)|}
+1 [τǫn=+∞]|g(X
t,x,uǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
T )− g(X
t′,x,u¯,βǫ(u¯)
T )|+ 1 [τǫn≤T ]{|(V
−)∗(τ ǫn, X
t,x,uǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
τǫn
)|
+|(V −)∗(τ
ǫ
n, X
t′,x,u¯,βǫ(u¯)
τǫn
)|}
]
+ 2ǫ.
(4.16)
We note that, there exists a constant C > 0 such that
E
[
1 [τǫn≤T ]{|(V
−)∗(τ ǫn, X
t,x,uǫ,βǫ(uǫ)
τǫn
)|+ |(V −)∗(τ
ǫ
n, X
t′,x,u¯,βǫ(u¯)
τǫn
)|}
]
≤
C
n
.
Also, taking the limit as t→ t′, and using the uniform continuity of f , g and c to obtain:
lim sup
t→t′
V −(t, x) ≤ V −(t′, x) +
C
n
+ 2ǫ.
As n and ǫ are arbitrary then sending ǫ→ 0 and n→ +∞, to obtain:
lim sup
t→t′
V −(t, x) ≤ V −(t′, x).
Therefore V − is upper semi-continuous. We then proved that V − is continuous in t. ✷
Corollary 2 The lower (resp,. upper) value functions are continuous on [0, T ] × Rn,
therefore we have V − = (V −)∗ = (V
−)∗ (resp,. V + = (V +)∗ = (V
+)∗). As a consequence,
V − (resp,. V +) satisfies the classical dynamic programming principle: given 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤
T , x ∈ Rn, and each family of Q[t,T ]−valued Ft,s-stopping times {τ
u,v, (u, v) ∈ Ût,T×V̂t,T },
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we have
V −(t, x) = inf
β∈B̂t,T
sup
u∈Ût,T
E
[ ∫ τu,β
t
f(r,X t,x,u,β(u)r )dr −
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤τu,β ]
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
l≥1
χ(ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤τu,β ] + V
−(τu,β , X
t,x,u,β(u)
τu,β
)
]
,
(4.17)
and
V +(t, x) = sup
α∈Ât,T
inf
v∈V̂t,T
E
[ ∫ τα,v
t
f(r,X t,x,α(v),vr )dr −
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm)1 [τm≤τα,v]
∏
l≥1
1 {τm 6=ρl}
+
∑
l≥1
χ(ρl, ηl)1 [ρl≤τα,v] + V
+(τα,v, X
t,x,α(v),v
τα,v )
]
.
(4.18)
5 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs Equation
In this section we prove that the two value functions are viscosity solutions of the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation (2.7) associated to the stochastic differential
game. We begin with the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 The lower and upper value functions satisfy the following properties:
for all t ∈ [0, T ) and x ∈ Rn,
(i) HχinfV (t, x) ≥ V (t, x). (5.1)
(ii) If HχinfV (t, x) > V (t, x), then H
c
supV (t, x) ≤ V (t, x). (5.2)
Proof . We make the proof only for V −, the other case being analogous.
(i) Let η ∈ V, for β ′(u) = η1 [t,T ] +
∑
l≥1
η′l1 [ρ′l,T ] we have
V −(t, x) ≤ sup
u∈Ut,T
J(t, x, u, β ′(u)).
Choose β(u) =
∑
l≥1
η′l1 [ρ′l,T ]. Then
V −(t, x) ≤ sup
u∈Ut,T
J(t, x+ η, u, β(u)) + χ(t, η),
from which we deduce that the following inequality holds:
V −(t, x) ≤ inf
η∈V
[
V −(t, x+ η) + χ(t, η)
]
.
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(ii) the proof proceeds by a case distinction, for τ = t in dynamic programming
principle, and the suboptimality of multiple impulses at the same time (Assumptions
(2.4) and (2.5)) we have
V −(t, x) = inf
ρ∈{t,+∞},η∈V
sup
τ∈{t,+∞},ξ∈U
[
− c(t, ξ)1 [τ=t]1 [ρ=+∞]
+χ(t, η)1 [ρ=t] + V
−(t, x+ ξ1 [τ=t]1 [ρ=+∞] + η1 [ρ=t])
]
.
As a consequence we have
V −(t, x) = inf
ρ∈{t,+∞}
[[
inf
η∈V
{χ(t, η) + V −(t, x+ η)}
]
1 [ρ=t] +
[
sup
τ∈{t,+∞},ξ∈U
{−c(t, ξ)1 [τ=t]
+V −(t, x+ ξ1 [τ=t])}
]
1 [ρ=+∞]
]
.
If HχinfV (t, x) > V (t, x), then
V −(t, x) = sup
τ∈{t,+∞},ξ∈U
{−c(t, ξ)1 [τ=t] + V
−(t, x+ ξ1 [τ=t])}.
Therefore,
V −(t, x) ≥ sup
ξ∈U
{−c(t, ξ) + V −(t, x+ ξ)}. ✷
Now we prove that the two value functions satisfy in the viscosity sense.
Theorem 4 The lower and upper value functions are viscosity solutions to the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation (2.7).
Proof.We give the proof for the lower value function V −, the other case being analogous.
First, we prove the supersolution property. Suppose V −− φ achieves a local minimum in
[t0, t0 + δ)× B(x0, δ) with V
−(t0, x0) = φ(t0, x0). We have by Proposition 3,
V −(t0, x0)−H
χ
infV
−(t0, x0) ≤ 0.
If
V −(t0, x0)−H
χ
infV
−(t0, x0) = 0,
then we are done. Now suppose
V −(t0, x0)−H
χ
infV
−(t0, x0) < −ǫ < 0,
we prove by contradiction that
−
∂φ
∂t
(t0, x0)−Lφ(t0, x0)− f(t0, x0) ≥ 0. (5.3)
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Suppose otherwise, i.e.,−
∂φ
∂t
(t0, x0) − Lφ(t0, x0) − f(t0, x0) < 0. Then without loss of
generality we can assume that −
∂φ
∂t
(t, x)−Lφ(t, x)− f(t, x) < 0 on [t0, t0+ δ)×B(x0, δ).
Define the stopping time τ by
τ = inf{t ∈ Q[t0,T ] : Xt /∈ B(x0, δ)× [t0, t0 + δ)} ∧ T.
By Ito’s formula
E[φ(τ,X t0,x0,u0,v0τ )]− φ(t0, x0) = E
[ ∫ τ
t0
(
∂φ
∂t
+ Lφ
)
(r,X t0,x0,u0,v0r )dr
]
. (5.4)
Let ǫ1 > 0, using the dynamic programming principle, we deduce the existence of a
strategy βǫ ∈ B̂t0,T such that
V −(t0, x0) ≥ E
[ ∫ τ∧ρ1
t0
f(r,X t0,x0,u0,β
ǫ(u0)
r )dr + χ(ρ1, η1)1 [ρ1≤τ∧ρ1]
+V −(τ ∧ ρ1, X
t0,x0,u0,β
ǫ(u0)
τ∧ρ1 )
]
− ǫ1
≥ E
[ ∫ τ∧ρ1
t0
f(r,X t0,x0,u0,β
ǫ(u0)
r )dr + 1 [ρ1≤τ ]
(
χ(ρ1, η1) + V
−(ρ1, X
t0,x0,u0,β
ǫ(u0)
ρ1
)
)]
+E
[
1 [ρ1>τ ]V
−(τ,X
t0,x0,u0,β
ǫ(u0)
τ )
]
− ǫ1
≥ E
[ ∫ τ∧ρ1
t0
f(r,X t0,x0,u0,v0r )dr + 1 [ρ1≤τ ]H
χ
infV
−(ρ1, X
t0,x0,u0,v0
ρ1
)
]
+E
[
1 [ρ1>τ ]V
−(τ,X t0,x0,u0,v0τ )
]
− ǫ1
≥ E
[ ∫ τ∧ρ1
t0
f(r,X t0,x0,u0,v0r )dr + V
−(ρ1 ∧ τ,X
t0,x0,u0,v0
ρ1∧τ
)
]
+ ǫ.P(ρ1 ≤ τ)− ǫ1.
Therefore, without loss of generality, we only need to consider βǫ ∈ B̂t0,T such that ρ1 > τ .
Then
φ(t0, x0) = V
−(t0, x0) ≥ E
[ ∫ τ
t0
f(r,X t0,x0,u0,v0r )dr + V
−(τ,X t0,x0,u0,v0τ )
]
− ǫ1
≥ E
[ ∫ τ
t0
f(r,X t0,x0,u0,v0r )dr + φ(τ,X
t0,x0,u0,v0
τ )
]
− ǫ1.
Then from (5.4) and sending ǫ1 → 0 we get
0 ≤ E
[ ∫ τ
t0
−
(
∂φ
∂t
+ Lφ+ f
)
(r,X t0,x0,u0,v0r )dr
]
,
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which is a contradiction. Therefore, we must have −
(
∂φ
∂t
+ Lφ+ f
)
(t0, x0) ≥ 0.
Thanks to Proposition 3, we have
HcsupV
−(t0, x0) ≤ V
−(t0, x0).
Therefore,
max
{
min
[
−
∂φ
∂t
(t0, x0)−Lφ(t0, x0)− f(t0, x0), V
−(t0, x0)−H
c
supV
−(t0, x0)
]
,
V −(t0, x0)−H
χ
infV
−(t0, x0)
}
≥ 0,
(5.5)
which is the supersolution property. The subsolution property is proved analogously.
✷
Now we give an equivalent of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation (2.7). We con-
sider the new function Γ given by the classical change of variable Γ(t, x) = exp(t)V (t, x),
for any t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ Rn.
A second property is given by the:
Proposition 4 V is a viscosity solution of (2.7) if and only if Γ is a viscosity solution
to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation in [0, T )× Rn,
max
{
min
[
Γ(t, x)−
∂Γ
∂t
(t, x)− LΓ(t, x)− exp(t)f(t, x)
,Γ(t, x)− H˜csupΓ(t, x)
]
,Γ(t, x)− H˜χinfΓ(t, x)
}
= 0,
(5.6)
where
H˜csupΓ(t, x) = sup
ξ∈U
[Γ(t, x+ ξ)− exp(t)c(t, ξ)]
H˜χinfΓ(t, x) = inf
η∈V
[Γ(t, x+ η) + exp(t)χ(t, η)].
The terminal condition for Γ is: Γ(T, x) = exp(T )g(x) in Rn.
6 Uniqueness of the solution of Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman-Isaacs equation
In this section we deal with the issue of uniqueness of the solution of system (2.7) and
to do so. We need to impose additional assumption of cost functions
22
(H6) There exists a function h : [0, T ]→ (0,∞) such that for all t ∈ [0, T ],
χ(t, η1 + η2) ≤ χ(t, η1) + χ(t, η2)− h(t), (6.1)
and
c(t, ξ1 + η + ξ2) ≤ c(t, ξ1)− χ(t, η) + c(t, ξ2)− h(t) (6.2)
for every ξ1, ξ2 ∈ U , and η, η1, η2 ∈ V.
To prove uniqueness viscosity solution to the HJBI equation (2.7), we begin with the
following technical lemma which also appears in [[30], Lemma 4.4], [[6], Lemma 6.1].
Lemma 3 Suppose U, V : [0, T ]× Rn → R are uniformly continuous functions viscosity
subsolution and a viscosity supersolution to the HJBI equation (2.7), respectively. Let
(t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ]× R
n, be such that
V (t0, x0) ≥ H
χ
infV (t0, x0) (6.3)
or
V (t0, x0) < H
χ
infV (t0, x0), U(t0, x0) ≤ H
c
supU(t0, x0). (6.4)
Then for every ǫ > 0, there exists x¯ ∈ Rn and δ > 0 such that
U(t0, x0)− V (t0, x0) ≤ U(t0, x¯)− V (t0, x¯) + ǫ
and
V (t, x) < HχinfV (t, x), U(t, x) > H
c
supU(t, x), (6.5)
when (t, x) ∈ [(t0 − δ) ∨ 0, t0 + δ]× B¯(x¯, δ), with t0 + δ < T.
Proof : Fix ǫ > 0, We divide the proof into three steps.
Step 1 Let (6.3) hold. Then for α1 ∈ (0, 1), there exists η0 ∈ V such that
V (t0, x0) ≥ V (t0, x0 + η0) + χ(t0, η0)− α1ǫ.
Then, we observe that
V (t0, x0 + η0 + η) + χ(t0, η)− V (t0, x0 + η0)
≥ V (t0, x0 + η0 + η) + χ(t0, η) + χ(t0, η0)− V (t0, x0)− α1ǫ
≥ χ(t0, η) + χ(t0, η0)− χ(t0, η0 + η)− α1ǫ.
Thus, by taking α1 sufficiently small and (6.1), we get
HχinfV (t0, x0 + η0)− V (t0, x0 + η0) > 0.
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If U(t0, x0 + η0) > H
c
supU(t0, x0 + η0), we take (t0, x¯) := (t0, x0 + η0). Otherwise at
(t0, x0 + η0) condition (6.4) holds.
On the other hand, its easy to check that
U(t0, x0 + η0)− V (t0, x0 + η0) ≥ U(t0, x0 + η0) + χ(t0, η0)− V (t0, x0)− α1ǫ
≥ U(t0, x0)− V (t0, x0)− α1ǫ
Step 2 Now, suppose that (6.4) holds at (t0, x0), then for α2 ∈ (0, 1), there exists
ξ0 ∈ U such that
U(t0, x0) ≤ U(t0, x0 + ξ0)− c(t0, ξ0) + α2ǫ.
Then, we have
U(t0, x0 + ξ0)− V (t0, x0 + ξ0) ≥ U(t0, x0) + c(t0, ξ0)− V (t0, x0 + ξ0)− α2ǫ
≥ U(t0, x0)− V (t0, x0)− α2ǫ.
By taking α2 sufficiently small and (6.2), we can show that
U(t0, x0 + ξ0) > H
c
supU(t0, x0 + ξ0).
If V (t0, x0 + ξ0) < H
χ
infV (t0, x0 + ξ0), we take (t0, x¯) := (t0, x0 + ξ0). Otherwise we can
proceed as in Step 1 and we find η0 ∈ V such that
V (t0, x0 + ξ0) ≥ V (t0, x0 + ξ0 + η0) + χ(t0, η0)− α2ǫ,
U(t0, x0 + η0 + ξ0)− V (t0, x0 + η0 + ξ0) ≥ U(t0, x0)− V (t0, x0)− 2α2ǫ,
and
V (t0, x0 + ξ0 + η0) < H
χ
infV (t0, x0 + ξ0 + η0).
On the other hand, we have
U(t0, x0 + ξ0 + η0 + ξ)− c(t0, ξ)− U(t0, x0 + ξ0 + η0)
≤ U(t0, x0 + ξ0 + η0 + ξ)− c(t0, ξ)− c(t0, ξ0)− U(t0, x0 + η0)
≤ U(t0, x0 + ξ0 + η0 + ξ)− c(t0, ξ)− c(t0, ξ0) + χ(t0, η0)− U(t0, x0)
≤ c(t0, ξ0 + η0 + ξ)− c(t0, ξ)− c(t0, ξ0) + χ(t0, η0).
Thus, by (6.2), we get
U(t0, x0 + η0 + ξ0) > H
c
supU(t0, x0 + η0 + ξ0).
Therefore we take (t0, x¯) := (t0, x0 + ξ0 + η0).
Step 3 We can find α > 0 such that{
U(t0, x¯) > U(t0, x¯+ ξ)− c(t0, ξ) + α ∀ξ ∈ U ,
V (t0, x¯) < V (t0, x¯+ η) + χ(t0, η)− α ∀η ∈ V.
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Thus, by uniform continuity of U, V, c, and χ we have{
U(t, x) > U(t, x+ ξ)− c(t, ξ)− 2u(|x− x¯| ∨ |t− t0|)− h(|t− t0|) + α,
V (t, x) < V (t, x+ η) + χ(t, η) + 2v(|x− x¯| ∨ |t− t0|) + w(|t− t0|)− α,
in which u, v, h and w are the modulus of continuity of U, V, c and χ respectively. There-
fore, there exists δ > 0 such that
V (t, x) < HχinfV (t, x), U(t, x) > H
c
supU(t, x), (6.6)
when (t, x) ∈ [(t0 − δ) ∨ 0, t0 + δ]× B¯(x¯, δ), with t0 + δ < T. ✷
We are going now to address the question of uniqueness of the viscosity solution of
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation (2.7). We have the following:
Theorem 5 The solution in viscosity sense of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation
(2.7) is unique in the space of bounded uniformly continuous functions on [0, T ]× Rn.
Proof. We will show by contradiction that if U and V is a subsolution and a supersolution
respectively for (5.6), then U ≤ V. Therefore if we have two solutions of (5.6) then
they are obviously equal. Actually for some R > 0 (large enough) suppose there exists
(tˆ, xˆ) ∈ [0, T ]×B(0, R) such that sup
t,x
(U(t, x)− V (t, x)) = U(tˆ, xˆ)− V (tˆ, xˆ) > 0.
Step 1. Using Lemma 3, we can find (t¯, x¯) ∈ [0, T )× Rn and δ such that
sup
I×B¯δ(x¯)
(U(t, x)− V (t, x)) ≥ U(t¯, x¯)− V (t¯, x¯) > 0, (6.7)
and
V (t, x) < H˜χinfV (t, x), U(t, x) > H˜
c
supU(t, x), (6.8)
for all (t, x) ∈ I × B¯(x¯, δ), where I := [t¯− δ, t¯+ δ] ⊂ [0, T ).
Let (t0, x0) ∈ I × B¯(x¯, δ) such that
sup
I×B¯(x¯,δ)
(U(t, x)− V (t, x)) = U(t0, x0)− V (t0, x0) = η > 0.
For a small ǫ, β, θ > 0, let us define:
Φǫ(t, x, y) = U(t, x)− V (t, y)−
1
2ǫ
|x− y|2 − θ(|x− x0|
4 + |y − x0|
4)
−β(t− t0)
2.
(6.9)
By the boundedness of U and V , that there exists a (tǫ, xǫ, yǫ) ∈ I × B¯(x¯, δ) × B¯(x¯, δ),
attaining the maximum of Φǫ on I × B¯(x¯, δ)× B¯(x¯, δ).
On the other hand, from 2Φǫ(tǫ, xǫ, yǫ) ≥ Φǫ(tǫ, xǫ, xǫ) + Φǫ(tǫ, yǫ, yǫ), we have
1
2ǫ
|xǫ − yǫ|
2 ≤ (U(tǫ, xǫ)− U(tǫ, yǫ)) + (V (tǫ, xǫ)− V (tǫ, yǫ)), (6.10)
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and consequently
1
2ǫ
|xǫ− yǫ|
2 is bounded, and as ǫ→ 0, |xǫ− yǫ| → 0. Since U and V are
uniformly continuous on I × B¯(x¯, δ), then
1
2ǫ
|xǫ − yǫ|
2 → 0 as ǫ→ 0.
Since Φǫ(tǫ, xǫ, yǫ) ≥ Φǫ(t0, x0, x0), we have
U(t0, x0)− V (t0, x0) ≤ Φǫ(tǫ, xǫ, yǫ) ≤ U(tǫ, xǫ)− V (tǫ, yǫ), (6.11)
it follow from the continuity of U and V that, up to a subsequence,
(tǫ, xǫ, yǫ)→ (t0, x0, x0)
θ(|xǫ − x0|
4 + |yǫ − x0|
4)→ 0
U(tǫ, xǫ)− V (tǫ, yǫ)→ U(t0, x0)− V (t0, x0).
(6.12)
Next, since x0 ∈ B¯(x¯, δ) then, for ǫ small enough and at least for a subsequence which we
still index by ǫ, we obtain
V (tǫ, yǫ) < H˜
χ
infV (tǫ, yǫ), U(tǫ, xǫ) > H˜
c
supU(tǫ, xǫ). (6.13)
Step 2. We now show that tǫ < T. Actually if tǫ = T then,
Φǫ(t0, x0, x0) ≤ Φǫ(T, xǫ, yǫ),
and,
U(t0, x0)− V (t0, x0) ≤ exp(T )g(xǫ)− exp(T )g(yǫ)− β(T − t0)
2,
since U(T, xǫ) = exp(T )g(xǫ), V (T, yǫ) = exp(T )g(yǫ) and g is uniformly continuous on
B¯(x¯, δ). Then as ǫ→ 0, we have,
η ≤ −β(T − t0)
2,
which yields a contradiction and we have tǫ ∈ [0, T ).
Step 3 To complete the proof it remains to show contradiction. Let us denote
ϕǫ(t, x, y) =
1
2ǫ
|x− y|2 + θ(|x− x0|
4 + |y − x0|
4) + β(t− t0)
2. (6.14)
Then we have:

Dtϕǫ(t, x, y) = 2β(t− t0),
Dxϕǫ(t, x, y) =
1
ǫ
(x− y) + 4θ(x− x0)|x− x0|
2,
Dyϕǫ(t, x, y) = −
1
ǫ
(x− y) + 4θ(y − x0)|y − x0|
2
B(t, x, y) = D2x,yϕǫ(t, x, y) =
1
ǫ
(
I −I
−I I
)
+
(
a(x) 0
0 a(y)
)
with a(x) = 4θ|x− x0|
2I + 8θ(x− x0)(x− x0)
∗.
(6.15)
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Then applying the result by Crandall et al. (Theorem 8.3, [7]) to the function
U(t, x) − V (t, y)− ϕǫ(t, x, y)
at the point (tǫ, xǫ, yǫ), for any ǫ1 > 0, we can find c, d ∈ IR and X, Y ∈ Sn, such that:

(
c,
1
ǫ
(xǫ − yǫ) + 4θ(xǫ − x0)|xǫ − x0|
2, X
)
∈ J2,+(U(tǫ, xǫ)),(
− d,
1
ǫ
(xǫ − yǫ)− 4θ(yǫ − x0)|yǫ − x0|
2, Y
)
∈ J2,−(V (tǫ, yǫ)),
c+ d = Dtϕǫ(tǫ, xǫ, yǫ) = 2β(tǫ − t0) and finally
−
( 1
ǫ1
+ ‖B(tǫ, xǫ, yǫ)‖
)
I ≤
(
X 0
0 −Y
)
≤ B(tǫ, xǫ, yǫ) + ǫ1B(tǫ, xǫ, yǫ)
2.
(6.16)
Then by definition of viscosity solution, we get:
−c+ U(tǫ, xǫ)− 〈
1
ǫ
(xǫ − yǫ) + 4θ(xǫ − x0)|xǫ − x0|
2,
b(tǫ, xǫ)〉 −
1
2
tr[σ∗(tǫ, xǫ)Xσ(tǫ, xǫ)]− exp(tǫ)f(tǫ, xǫ) ≤ 0
(6.17)
and
d+ V (tǫ, yǫ)− 〈
1
ǫ
(xǫ − yǫ)− 4θ(yǫ − x0)|yǫ − x0|
2,
b(tǫ, yǫ)〉 −
1
2
tr[σ∗(tǫ, yǫ)Y σ(tǫ, yǫ)]− exp(tǫ)f(tǫ, yǫ) ≥ 0,
(6.18)
which implies that:
−c− d+ U(tǫ, xǫ)− V (tǫ, yǫ)
≤ [〈
1
ǫ
(xǫ − yǫ), b(tǫ, xǫ)− b(tǫ, yǫ)〉
+〈4θ(xǫ − x0)|xǫ − x0|
2, b(tǫ, xǫ)〉+ 〈4θ(yǫ − x0)|yǫ − x0|
2, b(tǫ, yǫ)〉
+
1
2
tr[σ∗(tǫ, xǫ)Xσ(tǫ, xǫ)− σ
∗(tǫ, yǫ)Y σ(tǫ, yǫ)]
+ exp(tǫ)f(tǫ, xǫ)− exp(tǫ)f(tǫ, yǫ)].
(6.19)
But from (6.15) there exist a constant C > 0 such that:
(‖a(xǫ)‖ ∨ ‖a(yǫ)‖) ≤ Cθ.
As
B = B(tǫ, xǫ, yǫ) =
1
ǫ
(
I −I
−I I
)
+
(
a(xǫ) 0
0 a(yǫ)
)
Then
B ≤
1
ǫ
(
I −I
−I I
)
+ CθI.
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It follows that:
B + ǫ1B
2 ≤
ǫ+ ǫ1
ǫ2
(
I −I
−I I
)
+ CθI, (6.20)
where C which hereafter may change from line to line. Choosing now ǫ1 = ǫ, yields the
relation
B + ǫ1B
2 ≤
2
ǫ
(
I −I
−I I
)
+ CθI. (6.21)
Now, from (H1), (6.16) and (6.21) we get:
1
2
tr[σ∗(tǫ, xǫ)Xσ(tǫ, xǫ)− σ
∗(tǫ, yǫ)Y σ(tǫ, yǫ)] ≤
C
ǫ
|xǫ − yǫ|
2 + Cθ(1 + |xǫ|
2 + |yǫ|
2).
Next
〈
1
ǫ
(xǫ − yǫ), b(tǫ, xǫ)− b(tǫ, yǫ)〉 ≤
C
ǫ
|xǫ − yǫ|
2.
And finally,
〈4θ(xǫ − x0)|xǫ − x0|
2, b(tǫ, xǫ)〉+ 〈4θ(yǫ − x0)|yǫ − x0|
2, b(tǫ, yǫ)〉
≤ Cθ(1 + |xǫ||xǫ − x0|
3 + |yǫ||yǫ − x0|
3).
So that by plugging into (6.19) we obtain:
−2β(tǫ − t0) + U(tǫ, xǫ)− V (tǫ, yǫ)
≤
C
ǫ
|xǫ − yǫ|
2 + Cθ(1 + |xǫ|
2 + |yǫ|
2) +
C
ǫ
|xǫ − yǫ|
2
+Cθ(1 + |xǫ||xǫ − x0|
3 + |yǫ||yǫ − x0|
3)
+ exp(tǫ)f(tǫ, xǫ)− exp(tǫ)f(tǫ, yǫ).
(6.22)
By sending ǫ → 0, β → 0, θ → 0, and taking into account of the continuity of f , we
obtain η ≤ 0, which is a contradiction. The proof of Theorem 5 is now complete. ✷
Corollary 3 The lower and upper value functions coincide, and the value function of the
stochastic differential game is given by V (t, x) := V −(t, x) = V +(t, x) for every (t, x) ∈
[0, T )× Rn.
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